

of section 7(f) which were designed to validate, subject to express statutory limitations, contracts of a like kind in situations of the type considered by the Court (see § 778.404). Nothing in the legislative history of section 7(f) suggests any intent to suspend the normal application of the general overtime provisions of section 7(a) in situations where the weekly hours of an employee fluctuate only when overtime work in excess of the prescribed maximum weekly hours is performed. Section 7(a) was specifically designed to deal with such a situation by making such regular resort to overtime more costly to the employer and thus providing an inducement to spread the work rather than to impose additional overtime work on employees regularly employed for a workweek of the maximum statutory length. The “security of a regular weekly income” which the Supreme Court viewed as an important feature of the “Belo” wage plan militating against a holding that the contracts were invalid under the Act is, of course, already provided to employees who regularly work at least the maximum number of hours permitted without overtime pay under section 7(a). Their situation is not comparable in this respect to employees whose duties cause their weekly hours to fluctuate in such a way that some workweeks are short and others long and they cannot, without some guarantee, know in advance whether in a particular workweek they will be entitled to pay for the regular number of hours of non-overtime work contemplated by section 7(a). It is such employees whose duties necessitate “irregular hours” within the meaning of section 7(f) and whose “security of a regular weekly income” can be assured by a guarantee under that section which will serve to increase their hourly earnings in short workweeks under the statutory maximum hours. It is this benefit to the employee that the Supreme Court viewed, in effect, as a quid pro quo which could serve to balance a relaxation of the statutory requirement, applicable in other cases, that any overtime work should cost the employer 50 percent more per hour. In the enactment of section 7(f), as in the enactment of section 7(b) (1) and (2), the ben-

efits that might inure to employees from a balancing of long workweeks against short workweeks under prescribed safeguards would seem to be the reason most likely to have influenced the legislators to provide express exemptions from the strict application of section 7(a). Consequently, where the fluctuations in an employee’s hours of work resulting from his duties involve only overtime hours worked in excess of the statutory maximum hours, the hours are not “irregular” within the purport of section 7(f) and a payment plan lacking this factor does not qualify for the exemption. (See *Goldberg v. Winn-Dixie Stores* (S.D. Fla.), 15 WH Cases 641; *Wirtz v. Midland Finance Co.* (N.D. Ga.), 16 WH Cases 141; *Trager v. J. E. Plastics Mfg. Co.* (S.D.N.Y.), 13 WH Cases 621; *McComb v. Utica Knitting Co.*, 164 F. 2d 670; *Foremost Dairies v. Wirtz*, 381 F. 2d 653 (C.A. 5).)

§ 778.407 The nature of the section 7(f) contract.

Payment must be made “pursuant to a bona fide individual contract or pursuant to an agreement made as a result of collective bargaining by representatives of employees.” It cannot be a one-sided affair determinable only by examination of the employer’s books. The employee must not only be aware of but must have agreed to the method of compensation in advance of performing the work. Collective bargaining agreements in general are formal agreements which have been reduced to writing, but an individual employment contract may be either oral or written. While there is no requirement in section 7(f) that the agreement or contract be in writing, it is certainly desirable to reduce the agreement to writing, since a contract of this character is rather complicated and proof both of its existence and of its compliance with the various requirements of the section may be difficult if it is not in written form. Furthermore, the contract must be “bona fide.” This implies that both the making of the contract and the settlement of its terms were done in good faith.